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A Positive Political Model of Supreme 
Court Economic Decisions 
Tony Caporale* and Harold Wintert 
We develop a positive political model of the U.S. Supreme Court. Looking at the Court's 
economic cases for the period 1953-1993, we find a significant larger fraction of conservative 
decisions under Republican presidents and more conservative leadership of the House and 
Senate Judiciary Committees. Conservative decisions are also found to be positively correlated 
with the fraction of the Court appointed by Republican presidents and the rate of price inflation. 
We argue that our findings cast serious doubt on the common view of the Supreme Court as a 
completely independent, apolitical institution. 
1. Introduction 
A stark contrast exists between the widespread application of positive political economy 
models in the study of the executive and legislative branches of government and the relative 
dearth of such work on the judiciary. In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court is widely regarded 
as a totally independent body whose rulings are not influenced by political or other outside 
pressures. Indeed, the dominant political science model of Supreme Court decision making, the 
attitudinal model, argues that the rules and structures of the U.S. political system allow justices 
to vote sincerely without constraints from Congress and/or the president (Segal and Spaeth 
1993). 
In contrast to this dominant view, several authors have begun to analyze Supreme Court 
decisions guided by the positive models of bureaucratic behavior that exist in both the econom- 
ics and the political science literature. Toma (1991) finds that Congress signals its opinion of 
the Court's direction through budgetary allocations, and that budget changes have a significant 
effect on Court decisions. Her more recent work (Toma 1996) focuses on the role of the chief 
justice as an agent of Congress who reacts to budgetary signals to bring Court decisions in line 
with congressional preferences. Spiller and Gely (1992) find strong evidence of congressional 
influence over Court decisions in industrial labor relations cases. Caporale and Winter (1998) 
find support for the existence of both executive and congressional influence over Supreme Court 
decisions in criminal procedure cases. 
This paper investigates possible outside influences on Supreme Court decisions in econom- 
ic cases. We find that Republican presidents and more conservative leadership of the Senate 
and House Judiciary Committees are significantly correlated with more conservative Supreme 
Court economic decisions. In addition, we find that conservative decisions are positively cor- 
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694 Tony Caporale and Harold Winter 
related with the fraction of the Court appointed by Republican presidents. This provides strong 
support for a presidential "power of appointment" channel of judicial influence. Also, we find 
that the lagged inflation rate significantly influences the direction of the Court's economic de- 
cisions. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of our results using an alternative measure of 
congressional ideology. 
2. Theories of Supreme Court Behavior 
The Traditional Legal Model 
Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise discretion, 
it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, 
when that is discerned, it is the duty of the Court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the 
purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the 
Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the Law. 
-Chief Justice John Marshall, 1824' 
As recent legal analysts have noted, the vast bulk of legal scholarship and content of law 
school training largely rests on Justice Marshall's contention.2 Explicitly or implicitly, an as- 
sumption is made that court decisions are based centrally on reasoned arguments. This view, 
in which judges apply neutral principles and logical reasoning to the Constitution, prior prec- 
edents, or statutes in resolving cases is labeled the "traditional legal model." 
Perhaps the clearest proponent and strongest advocate of the traditional model was Chris- 
topher Columbus Langdell, the Harvard Law School's first dean.3 For the Langdellian judge, 
judicial decisions are based on logical reasoning or reasoning by example. Primary importance 
is placed on textual interpretation and legal precedent. From this framework, decisions can be 
viewed as inevitable conclusions based on the analysis of earlier cases. Clearly, this model left 
no room for any expression of judicial individuality or personal ideology. 
The Attitudinal Model 
In contrast to the formalism of the traditional model, political scientists have developed 
an alternative theory of Supreme Court (and other judicial) decision making: the attitudinal 
model. The attitudinal model holds that judges decide disputes on the basis of their sincere 
ideological attitudes and values. The attitudinal model assumes that judges can maximize utility 
by rendering the decision that most pleases them ideologically, without regard to other insti- 
tutions or considerations. Judges are viewed as making result-oriented ecisions based on ide- 
ology as opposed to the law or legal precedent. 
The foundation for the attitudinal theory was laid by the important work by Pritchett (1948) 
on the Roosevelt Supreme Court. Using simple statistics to analyze micro-level voting, he 
identified distinct liberal and conservative voting blocs. Although he did not present a model 
of the Court's decision making, his work led to the development of behavioral models of the 
Supreme Court. 
Rhode and Spaeth (1976) provide the classic formulation of the attitudinal model. They 
I Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824). 
2 For example, see Cross (1997) and George (1998). 
See Grey (1983) for a discussion of the genesis of Langdell's theory of law. 
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argue that the primary goals of justices are policy goals, and voting is an attempt to move 
decision outcomes as closely as possible to those policy preferences. Justices are free to vote 
according to their sincere preferences since various institutional protections (e.g., life tenure and 
the fact that there is no higher appeal) insulate them from outside influences. 
Positive Political Theory 
Positive political theory (PPT) applied to the Supreme Court largely agrees with the atti- 
tudinalists that justices are making political, policy-oriented decisions. However, proponents of 
PPT argue that the Court is not insulated from political pressure and that the institutional 
protection of the Court is not complete. For example, Congress can readily overturn the Court's 
statutory decisions. Therefore, if the Court is concerned about ultimate policy outcomes, it must 
take the political climate into account when rendering decisions. Recent empirical work by 
Toma (1991, 1996), Spiller and Gely (1992), and Caporale and Winter (1998) all provide support 
for the PPT approach applied to the Supreme Court. 
3. Supreme Court Data 
Our data on Supreme Court economics cases are taken from Harold Spaeth's exhaustive 
U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-1993 term.4 Spaeth partitions the data into 13 
different broad issue areas, including one on economic activity.5 Our sample includes all eco- 
nomic activity cases that were fully argued before the Court between 1953 and 1993 for which 
Spaeth assigns a direction to the decision. In the context of economic activity cases, Spaeth's 
direction variable is a binary variable assigned a value of 1 if the decision is "conservative" 
and a value of 0 if the decision is "liberal." In the description of his database, Spaeth describes 
"liberal" in the context of economic activity cases to refer to such situations as anti-business, 
anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-liability, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small busi- 
ness vis-a-vis large business, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-environmental protection, pro-eco- 
nomic underdog, pro-consumer, and pro-accountability in governmental corruption. 
In previous studies examining labor union cases and criminal procedure cases, the direction 
variable appears to be less ambiguous than in the current study. For example, in labor union 
cases, "liberal" refers to pro-union. In criminal procedure cases, "liberal" refers to pro-defen- 
dant. Because the meaning of "liberal" in economic activity cases may at times appear ambig- 
uous, it is worth briefly examining a few individual cases to better understand Spaeth's definition 
of his direction variable. 
Antitrust 
In a 1988 "liberal" decision, a group of doctors who owned a clinic peer reviewed and 
barred another doctor (who owned a competing clinic) from using the only local hospital. The 
doctors' claim that physician peer review is exempt from federal antitrust laws was denied.6 In 
4 Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) database no. 9422. 
5 The other broad issue areas are criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, attorneys, 
unions, judicial power, federalism, interstate relations, federal taxation, and miscellaneous. 
6 Patrick v. Burget, 108 S.Ct. 1658 (1988). 
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another 1988 case, one retailer of calculators complained to the manufacturer about another 
local retailer's prices, and the manufacturer terminated its relationship with the second dealer- 
ship. The terminated dealer's claim that the first dealer and the manufacturer were involved in 
a per se illegal vertical agreement was denied by the Court. The "conservative" decision was 
that for a vertical agreement to be per se illegal, there must be some agreement on prices, 
which did not occur in this case.7 
Legal Remedies 
In a 1998 case, an injured worker at a federally owned but privately operated nuclear plant 
appealed to a state regulator for additional benefits to be paid out by the plant. The "liberal" 
decision was a denial by the Court of the plant's request for federal shielding of state regulation.8 
In a "conservative" 1988 decision, a former federal employee who was suspended because of 
misconduct was denied the right to receive back pay.9 
State Tax 
In a 1988 case, a taxpayer challenged the state of Louisiana's authority to tax a catalog 
that was produced outside the state but distributed within the state. The Court's "liberal" de- 
cision was to uphold Louisiana's right to tax the catalog.'0 In a 1989 case, a taxpayer challenged 
the state of West Virginia's authority to assess a recently sold property higher than comparable 
(but not recently sold) property. The Court's "conservative" decision was that West Virginia's 
discriminatory taxing policy violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause." 
Although these cases represent only a portion of the type of cases included in Spaeth's 
category of economic activity cases, they provide an indication of the meaning of the direction 
variable.12 While a criterion such as "pro-competition" may be ambiguous to an economist, 
such as in the case of a merger potentially being pro-competitive or anti-competitive, to Spaeth 
a merger that is upheld by the Court would always be an example of a "conservative" decision. 
This is not a criticism of Spaeth's definition since he is not categorizing his decisions as eco- 
nomically efficient or inefficient. Indeed, the important point is that his definitions of "liberal" 
and "conservative" fit well with what congressmen and senators (and their constituents) believe 
the terms to mean. 
Over the 41-year sample period, there are 9743 decisions in the economics cases category. 
As there are enough decisions in any single year (a minimum of 117 in 1954 and a maximum 
of 403 in 1986), we can compute a variable that measures the percentage of conservative 
decisions in each year. In contrast to Spiller and Gely, for example, our dependent variable is 
a continuous, as opposed to a binary, measure of Supreme Court voting behavior. While their 
measure allows them to use a data set with 249 observations, ours allows for a sample with 
7 Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, 108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988). 
8 Goodyear Atomic v. Miller, 108 S.Ct. 1704 (1988). 
9 U.S. v. Fausto, 108 S.Ct. 668 (1988). 
I D. H. Holmes v. McNamara, 108 S.Ct. 1619 (1988). 
" Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal v. County Commission of Webster County, 109 S.Ct. 633 (1989). 
12 Some of the other issues included in the economic activity category are state regulation of business, environmental 
protection of natural resources, zoning, federal consumer protection, patents and copyrights, federal transportation 
regulation, bankruptcy, liability (nongovernmental), federal regulation of securities, and federal public utilities regula- 
tion. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of Conservative Supreme Court Economic Decisions 
only 41 observations. However, because all their (and our) explanatory variables have no cross- 
sectional variation, any variation in the dependent variable in either form can be due only to 
yearly variations in the explanatory variables.13 One advantage of our measure is that it allows 
us to use a large number of Supreme Court cases. For Spiller and Gely's interest in labor union 
cases, our measure would not be as informative because their data set consists of, on average, 
only six decisions per year. Coincidentally, the Spaeth data set we employ does not include 
labor union cases in the economics cases category, so we are presenting evidence of political 
influence over the Supreme Court with a previously unused data set. Figure 1 is a plot of our 
dependent variable over the sample period. Dickey-Fuller and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
strongly reject the presence of a unit root in our dependent variable. The mean of our dependent 
variable is .455 (standard deviation = .17) and ranges between .695 and .132. 
4. Hypotheses and Empirical Results 
Prior to searching for outside influences on Supreme Court voting, we must deal with the 
problem of selection bias in our data. This bias arises because the Court can uphold a decision 
simply by refusing to hear a case. Therefore, we expect to find an inverse relationship between 
the average direction of the lower court ruling and that of the Supreme Court. To correct for 
this bias, we include a variable that measures the average direction of the lower-court decisions 
for the cases in our sample.14 
The first hypothesis that we test concerns the role of the president in influencing the Court. 
We argue that Republican presidents prefer more conservative economic decisions than do 
'3 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we emphasize this difference between our data set 
and Spiller and Gely's. 
14 Spiller and Gely (1992, p. 479) provide a clear discussion of this point. 
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Table 1. Political Influence over Supreme Court Economic Case Decisions, 1953-1993 
Variable Eqn. I Eqn. 2 Eqn. 3 Eqn. 4 
Constant 0.67 0.91 1.38 0.76 
(6.45) (11.64) (7.71) (6.72) 
Lower court, % -0.33 -0.23 -0.22 -0.13 
conservative decisions (1.84) (1.70) (1.62) (0.92) 
Supreme Court, % -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 
Democratic appointments (2.29) (5.53) (5.88) (4.50) 
Republican presidential 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.16 
dummy (3.29) (5.26) (3.78) (5.41) 
Judiciary Committee -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
chair ADA (Senate) (5.79) (6.85) (3.78) 
Judiciary Committee -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
chair ADA (house) (4.31) (4.35) (4.76) 
% Republican Senate -0.0003 
(0.12) 
% Republican House -0.007 
(1.88) 
Lagged inflation 0.012 
(2.59) 
Lagged output growth 0.002 
(0.67) 
R2 0.48 0.70 0.76 0.76 
Absolute value of HAC t-statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the annual percentage of conservative 
Supreme Court economic case decisions. 
Democratic presidents. A direct way to capture the possible effect of these preferences is to 
incorporate a dummy variable for presidential party. An additional source of executive influence 
on the Court, pointed out by Dahl (1957), arises because presidents select justices subject to 
Senate confirmation.'5 Since presidential nominees to the Court are likely not to differ signifi- 
cantly in ideology from their nominating executive, we anticipate that the larger the fraction of 
the Court nominated by Republicans (Democrats), the larger, on average, the fraction of con- 
servative (liberal) decisions.16 
Equation 1 of Table 1 confirms these hypotheses. Our Republican presidential dummy 
variable is positively and significantly correlated with the annual percentage of conservative 
Supreme Court economic decisions. Quantitatively, we find that on average there are 14% more 
economic case decisions decided in a conservative direction under Republican administrations 
than there are under Democratic ones. We also find a significant inverse relationship between 
the fraction of justices appointed by Democratic presidents and conservative decisions. The 
standardized coefficient on this variable reveals that a one-standard-deviation increase leads to 
a .37-standard-deviation decline in the fraction of conservative decisions (roughly 6% fewer). 
This supports an additional power of appointment executive influence.'7 
In Equation 2 (Table 1), we test for congressional influence over the Court. Spiller and 
15 Recent work by Sutter (1997) stresses the interrelationship between political agents and the Supreme Court. 
16 Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor (1993) show a significant effect of this presidential power of appointment in the 
context of monetary policy. 
17 Each regression in this paper is estimated using Newey and West's covariance matrix estimator (HAC) that is consistent 
in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of an unknown form. 
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Gely argue that this influence stems from the ability of Congress to overturn decisions via 
legislation. Although such actions are rare, Weingast and Moran (1983) show that overt action 
does not necessarily indicate the lack of effective congressional monitoring. In this case, the 
threat of possible reversals via legislation will limit the Court's ability to deviate too far from 
congressional preferences."' We measure congressional preference by using the Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA) scores of the chairs of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. 
The Judiciary Committees are used since they are directly responsible for overseeing the Su- 
preme Court.19 ADA scores range between 100 (a perfect liberal voting record) and 0. 
We expect a negative relationship between the ADA scores and our dependent variable. 
The mean value of the ADA scores of the Senate Judiciary Committee chair is 25.83 (standard 
deviation = 35). The average score for the House chair is 79.31 (standard deviation = 26). The 
results in Equation 2 strongly support our hypothesis of an inverse relationship between con- 
servative Court decisions and our congressional variables. Both coefficients for the congressio- 
nal variables are significant at better than the .01 level. Quantitatively, we find that a 35-point 
increase in the ADA score of the Senate Judiciary Committee chair leads to an approximately 
7% decline in the fraction of conservative economic decisions. A similar-size result is found 
for our House chair variable-a one-standard-deviation rise in the ADA score leads to about a 
7% decline in the fraction of conservative Court decisions. In addition, our congressional var- 
iables do not weaken the influence of our executive measures, which both remain strongly 
significant with similar magnitudes. 
In Equation 3 (Table 1), we take a closer look at the effect of Congress on the Court. 
Although our committee leadership variable works well, it could be picking up the effect of 
Congress as a whole. We test for this possibility by including the annual percentage of Repub- 
licans in both the House and the Senate as regressors. The results show that our full congres- 
sional body measures are insignificant both individually and as a group. However, both the 
Judiciary Committee leadership ADA measures and the executive variables remain strongly 
significant. This result reinforces our view that committee leadership provides the best measure 
of congressional influence. 
Lastly, we test whether macroeconomic conditions influence Supreme Court rulings in 
regard to economic cases. We include the lagged values of inflation and output growth in our 
empirical model. In looking for an output effect on the Court, we borrow from Peltzman's 
(1976) theory of regulation, which suggests that regulation should be more pro-business during 
economic downturns and more pro-consumer during expansions. Shughart and Tollison (1985) 
provide empirical support for this contention. In our setting, we expect that the conservative 
fraction of the Court's economic decisions should be counter-cyclical. Using a similar line of 
reasoning, we expect a positive relationship between inflation and the fraction of conservative 
economic decisions. Many of the liberal categories (e.g., pro-liability, pro-environment, and pro- 
regulation) involve, in general, case decisions that would tend to raise prices. We would then 
expect, ceteris paribus, fewer of those decisions in times of rising prices. The results in Equation 
4 (Table 1) show that a higher value of lagged inflation is associated with more conservative 
Supreme Court economic decisions. Quantitatively, we find that a one-standard-deviation 
18 Toma (1991) suggests a more direct signaling game between the Court and Congress via budgetary allocations. 
19 Here we are assuming disproportionate committee power. Shepsle and Weingast (1987) provide a classic discussion. 
We also assume that committee chairs have more influence than rank-and-file committee members. Grier (1991, 1996) 
provides empirical support for this assumption with regard to monetary policy. 
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Table 2. Political Model with Alternative Congressional Preference Variables, 1953-1993 
Variable Eqn. 1 Eqn. 2 Eqn. 3 
Constant 0.94 0.47 0.71 
(7.62) (1.31) (5.26) 
Lower court, % conservative decisions -0.29 -0.28 -0.14 
(1.86) (1.88) (0.83) 
Supreme Court, % Democratic appointments -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 
(5.08) (1.73) (4.46) 
Republican presidential dummy 0.15 0.19 0.15 
(3.98) (4.50) (4.84) 
Deflated Judiciary Committee chair ADA (Senate) -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
(4.87) (5.31) (3.60) 
Deflated Judiciary Committee chair ADA (House) -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
(3.43) (3.42) (4.08) 
Deflated average ADA scores (Senate) - 0.009 
(1.48) 
Deflated average ADA scores (House) - 0.001 
(0.13) 
Lagged inflation 0.019 
(3.03) 
Lagged output growth 0.003 
(1.00) 
R2 0.67 0.70 0.73 
Absolute value of HAC t-statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the annual percentage of conservative 
Supreme Court economic case decisions. 
(3.02%) increase in lagged inflation, ceteris paribus, leads to a 3.5% increase in the fraction 
of conservative economic decisions. However, no significant relationship was found between 
the Court's economic decisions and economic growth. 
5. Additional Measures of Congressional Change 
In Table 2, we take another look at the effect of congressional change on Supreme Court 
economic case decisions. Although our preferred variable uses the annual ADA score of the 
House and Senate Judiciary Committee chair to measure congressional preferences, such mea- 
sures do have certain problems. Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) argue that ADA scores 
are difficult o compare over time since interest groups use different sets of votes each year to 
calculate scores. A similar problem arises when comparing members across chambers since 
different sets of votes are used for the House and Senate. Fortunately, Groseclose, Levitt, and 
Snyder have managed to construct an index that allows researchers to convert "nominal" ADA 
scores into "real" scores, which can be used to make intertemporal and interchamber compar- 
isons.20 
Equation 1 in Table 2 replaces the nominal ADA score of the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committee chair with deflated measures based on the GLS index. The average of our adjusted 
ADA measure is 20.22 for the Senate (standard deviation = 32) and 74.36 for the House 
20 Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) demonstrate that their inflation-adjusted ADA scores matter by showing that the 
conclusions of a previous study by Levitt (1996) dramatically change once the adjusted scores are used. 
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(standard deviation = 26). We find that the deflated measures of congressional preference are 
both negative and significant at the .01 level. The standardized coefficients reveal that a one- 
standard-deviation increase in the Senate (House) score leads to a 6.5% (7.7%) decrease in the 
fraction of conservative economic decisions. The inclusion of these alternative measures does 
not substantively affect the statistical or quantitative significance of our two presidential vari- 
ables. Thus, the results presented in Table 1 are robust to these index number changes. 
Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) also allow us to compute the annual deflated ADA 
scores of the full Senate and House. These measures are added in Equation 2 (Table 2) to once 
again check whether the committee leadership variable is really picking up changes in the full 
congressional body. Although our previous congressional and executive variables remain sig- 
nificant, an F-test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the full chamber deflated average 
scores were jointly insignificant. We argue that this provides the strongest evidence to date 
regarding the relative importance of committee chairs in exerting congressional influence. 
Lastly, Equation 3 (Table 2) adds our macroeconomic variables to the political model. 
Once again, we find that lagged inflation is positive and significant, while lagged output growth 
is insignificant. Overall, the results in Table 2 show the robustness of our specifications and 
major results. 
6. Concluding Comment 
Although most legal scholars view the Supreme Court as a completely insulated, indepen- 
dent, and apolitical institution, social scientists have recently started to subject it to the same 
scrutiny they have applied in other settings. Analyzing Supreme Court voting on economic 
cases for the period 1953-1993, we uncover strong evidence of executive, legislative, and 
macroeconomic influence on Court behavior. These results are robust to various specification 
changes in our models and measurement changes in our variables. They support the small (but 
growing) view that the Supreme Court is influenced by political forces and should not be viewed 
as an autonomous decision-making unit. 
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